Volume 35, Issue 4 (IJIEPR 2024)                   IJIEPR 2024, 35(4): 143-166 | Back to browse issues page


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Esmaeili P, Rasti-Bazroki M. Pricing, Advertising, and Service Decisions in a Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain with Nash, Stackelberg-Retailer, and Cooperative Games. IJIEPR 2024; 35 (4) :143-166
URL: http://ijiepr.iust.ac.ir/article-1-2108-en.html
1- PHD of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology , parinaz.esmaeili.zn@gmail.com
2- Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan 84156-83111, Iran
Abstract:   (313 Views)
This paper examines the simultaneous decisions regarding advertising, pricing, and service to supply chain coordination involving one manufacturer and one retailer. Demand is impacted by these decisions, with service playing a crucial role in enhancing customer loyalty and boosting sales. The study employs three well-known game theory approaches—Nash, Stackelberg-Retailer, and Cooperative games—to analyze their effects on the supply chain. Optimal strategies for both the manufacturer and the retailer are identified within each approach, and the strategies' results are compared. Results show that the retailer manufacturer, and the entire system achieves higher profits through the Stackelberg-Retailer game compared to the Nash game, while the Cooperative game results in the highest overall profits. Finally, the Nash bargaining model is outlined and analyzed to assess opportunities for sharing profits.
 
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Type of Study: Research | Subject: Logistic & Apply Chain
Received: 2024/09/2 | Accepted: 2024/11/2 | Published: 2024/12/10

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