Volume 28, Issue 4 (IJIEPR 2017)                   IJIEPR 2017, 28(4): 389-401 | Back to browse issues page

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PhD Department of Industrial Engineering, K. N. Toosi University of Technolog , Ramezanian@kntu.ac.ir
Abstract:   (1079 Views)

This study considers pricing, production and transportation decisions in a Stackelberg game between three-stage, multi-product, multi-source and single-period supply chains called leader and follower. These chains consist of; manufacturers, distribution centers (DCs) and retailers. Competition type is horizontal and SC vs. SC. The retailers in two chains try to maximize their profit through pricing of products in different markets and regarding the transportation and production costs. A bi-level nonlinear programming model is formulated in order to represent the Stackelberg game. Pricing decisions are based on discrimination pricing rules, where we can put different prices in different markets. After that the model is reduced to single-level nonlinear programming model by replacing Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the lower level (follower) problem. Finally, a numerical example is solved in order to analyze the sensitivity of effective parameters on price and profit.

Full-Text [PDF 378 kb]   (285 Downloads)    
Type of Study: Research | Subject: Logistic & Apply Chain
Received: 2017/05/13 | Accepted: 2017/10/30 | Published: 2017/11/20